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ABSTRACT
Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is an emerging network
architecture designed to overcome limitations of the current
IP-based Internet. One of the fundamental tenets of CCN
is that data, or content, is a named and addressable entity
in the network. Consumers request content by issuing in-
terest messages with the desired content name. These in-
terests are forwarded by routers to producers, and the re-
sulting content object is returned and optionally cached at
each router along the path. In-network caching makes it dif-
ficult to enforce access control policies on sensitive content
outside of the producer since routers only use interest in-
formation for forwarding decisions. To that end, we pro-
pose an Interest-Based Access Control (IBAC) scheme that
enables access control enforcement using only information
contained in interest messages, i.e., by making sensitive con-
tent names unpredictable to unauthorized parties. Our IBAC
scheme supports both hash- and encryption-based name ob-
fuscation. We address the problem of interest replay attacks
by formulating a mutual trust framework between producers
and consumers that enables routers to perform authorization
checks when satisfying interests from their cache. We assess
the computational, storage, and bandwidth overhead of each
IBAC variant. Our design is flexible and allows producers to
arbitrarily specify and enforce any type of access control on
content, without having to deal with the problems of content
encryption and key distribution. This is the first comprehen-
sive design for CCN access control using only information
contained in interest messages.
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the original Internet in the 1970s was
to provide end-to-end communication for a few thou-
sand users to access scarce and expensive resources via
terminals. Since then the number of Internet users has
grown exponentially, reaching more than 3 billion, with
each using a wide variety of applications from the dy-
namic web to content distribution. This shift of usage
exposed certain limitations of the IP-based Internet de-
sign and motivated exploration of new architectures.
Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is an approach
to inter-networking exemplified by two well-known re-
search efforts: CCNx [18] and Named-Data Networking
(NDN) [11]. The main goal of CCN is to develop the
next-generation Internet architecture with an emphasis
on efficient content distribution, security, and privacy.
Unlike current IP-based networking where data is re-
quested by addressing the machine where it is hosted,
each CCN content is assigned a unique name. Users
(referred to as consumers) request content objects by
issuing an interest for a given name. This interest can
then be satisfied or served from any entity (i.e., pro-
ducer or router) as long as the replied content’s name
matches that of the interest.
To facilitate efficient content distribution, a CCN router
maintains a cache. This enables routers to satisfy in-
terests, which reduces end-to-end latency and decreases
bandwidth utilization when requesting popular content.
Since interest messages may be satisfied by any cached
version of the content, interest messages may not, and
need not, reach the producer. Therefore, enforcing con-
tent access control within the network is a challenge.
Furthermore, even if all interests are forwarded to pro-
ducers, the latter might not be able to enforce access
control since interest messages, by design, do not carry
any form of consumer identification or authentication
information.
In this paper, we propose an access control scheme
based on interests – Interest-Based Access Control (IBAC).
The intuition is that if consumers are not allowed ac-
cess to certain content, they should not be able to gen-
erate the corresponding interests, i.e., they should not
be able to learn the content’s name. IBAC may also be
used with content encryption to conceal both the name
and the payload of the content object. However, using
IBAC in isolation is advantageous in scenarios where
content object payloads may need to be modified by
an intermediate service, e.g., a media encoding applica-
tion or proxy. In this case, content encryption prevents
such modifications by services or applications besides
the producer. Moreover, although IBAC involves the
network layer, we believe that this is necessary to al-
low routers (with caches) to enforce access control. To
be more specific, we claim that any entity which serves
content should also be able to authorize interests for said
content.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• Architectural modifications to support IBAC with-
out diminishing caching benefits.
• A mutual trust scheme wherein routers can verify
whether consumers are authorized to access cached
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content.
• A security analysis of the proposed IBAC scheme.
• Evaluation of router performance overhead when
serving content via IBAC compared to publicly ac-
cessible content.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents an overview of CCN architectures in the con-
text of CCNx. Section 3 then provides an overview of
access control techniques for CCN, including encryption-
and interest-based access control. Section 4 presents
the relevant security definitions and adversarial models
used to assess the IBAC scheme discussed at length in
Section 5. We discuss the IBAC security consideration
in Section 6. We then analyze the overhead incurred by
IBAC in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
2. CCN OVERVIEW
Content Centric Networking (CCN) is one of the main
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) architectures. Re-
lated architectures, such as Named Data Networking
(NDN) [24], are similar, albeit with some small protocol
and packet format differences. This section overviews
ICNs in the context of the CCN protocol and CCNx
reference implementation. Given familiarity with ei-
ther CCN or NDN, it can be skipped without loss of
continuity.
In contrast to TCP/IP, which focuses on end-points
of communication and their names and addresses, ICN
architectures such as CCN [11, 18] focus on content by
making it named, addressable, and routable within the
network. A content name is a URI-like [2] name com-
posed of one or more variable-length name components,
each separated by a / character. To obtain content, a
user (consumer) issues a request, called an interest mes-
sage, with the name of the desired content. This interest
will be satisfied by either (1) a router cache or (2) the
content producer. A content object message is returned
to the consumer upon satisfaction of the interest. More-
over, name matching in CCN is exact, e.g., an interest
for lci:/facebook/Alice/profile.html can only be
satisfied by a content object named lci:/facebook/
Alice/profile.html.1
Aside from the content name, CCN interest messages
may include the following fields:
• Payload – enables consumers to push data to pro-
ducers along with the request.2
• KeyID – an optional hash digest of the public key
used to verify the desired content’s digital signa-
ture. If this field exists, the network guarantees
that only content objects which can be verified
with the specified key will be returned in response
to an interest.
• ContentObjectHash – an optional hash value of
the content being requested. If this field exists,
1Name matching is not exact in NDN [24].
2Currently, NDN interest messages do not provide an
arbitrary-length payload and therefore cannot support the
proposed IBAC scheme. However, if in the future the NDN
interest format is modified to include a field similar to the
CCNx payload, our IBAC scheme will become applicable.
the network guarantees the delivery of the exact
content that consumer requests.
CCN content objects include several fields. In this work,
we are only interested in the following three:
• Name – a URI-like name formatted as a sequence
of /-separated name components.
• Validation – a composite of validation algorithm
information (e.g., the signature algorithm used, its
parameters, and a link to the public verification
key), and validation payload (e.g., the signature).
We use the term “signature” to refer to this field.
• ExpiryTime – an optional, producer-recommended
time for the content objects to be cached.
There are three basic types of entities in CCN that are
responsible for transferring interest and content object
messages:3
• Consumer – an entity that issues an interest for
content.
• Producer – an entity that produces and publishes
content.
• Router – an entity that routes interest packets and
forwards corresponding content packets.
Each CCN entity must maintain the following two com-
ponents:
• Forwarding Interest Base (FIB) – a table of name
prefixes and corresponding outgoing interfaces. The
FIB is used to route interests based on longest-
prefix-matches of their names.
• Pending Interest Table (PIT) – a table of outstand-
ing (pending) interests and a set of corresponding
incoming interfaces.
An entity may store an optional Content Store (CS),
which is a buffer used for content caching and retrieval.
Again, the timeout of cached content is specified in the
ExpiryTime field of the content header. From here on,
we use the terms CS and cache interchangeably.
Router entities use the FIB to forward interests from
consumers to producers, and then later use the PIT to
forward content object messages along the reverse path
to the consumer. More specifically, upon receiving an
interest, a router R first checks its cache to see if it can
satisfy this interest locally. Producer-originated digi-
tal signatures allow consumers to authenticate received
content, regardless of the entity that actually served
the content. Moreover, the Interest-Key Binding rule
(IKB) [8] enables routers to efficiently verify received
content signatures before caching, in order to avoid con-
tent poisoning attacks [7]. Essentially, consumers and
producers provide routers with the required trust con-
text to enable efficient signature verification.
When a router R receives an interest for name N
that is not cached and there are no pending interests
for the same name in its PIT, R forwards the interest
to the next hop according to its FIB. For each forwarded
interest, R stores some amount of state information, in-
cluding the name of the interest and the interface from
which it arrived, so that content may be sent back to
the consumer. If an interest for N arrives while there is
3A physical entity, or host, can be both a consumer and
producer of content.
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already an entry for the same content name in the PIT,
R only needs to update the arriving interface. When
content is returned, R forwards it to all of the corre-
sponding incoming interfaces, and the PIT entry is re-
moved. If a router receives a content object without a
matching PIT entry, the message is deemed unsolicited
and subsequently discarded.
3. ACCESS CONTROL OVERVIEW
One key feature of CCN is that content is decoupled
from its source; there is no notion of a secure channel be-
tween a consumer and producer. Consequently, ensur-
ing that only authorized entities have access to content
is a fundamental problem. In this section, we explore
complementary approaches to access control: (1) con-
tent encryption and (2) interest name obfuscation and
authorization.
3.1 Encryption-Based Access Control
The most intuitive solution to the access control prob-
lem is via encrypted content which can only be de-
crypted by authorized consumers possessing the appro-
priate decryption key(s). This enables content objects
to be disseminated throughout the network since they
cannot be decrypted by adversaries without the appro-
priate decryption key(s).
Many variations of this approach have been proposed
[20, 17, 10, 22]. Kurihara et al. [16] generalized these
specialized approaches in a framework called CCN-AC,
an encryption-based access control framework to im-
plement, specify, and enforce access policies. It uses
CCN manifests4 to encode access control specification
information for a particular set of content objects. Con-
sumers use information in the manifest to (1) request
appropriate decryption keys and (2) use them to de-
crypt the content object(s) in question.
Outside of ICN, there have been many proposed ac-
cess control frameworks based on encryption. Recently,
access control in shared cloud storage or social network
services, e.g., Google Drive, Dropbox, and Facebook,
generated a great deal of attention from the research
community [25, 21, 23, 12]. For instance, Kamara et al.
[13] modeled encryption-based access control framework
for cloud storage. Microsoft PlayReady [1] is another
popular access control framework for encrypted content
dissemination over the Internet.
Despite its widespread use, encryption-based access
control causes potentially prohibitive overhead for both
producers and consumers. It most cases where hybrid
encryption is used, it also requires keys to be distributed
alongside each content object, which introduces another
consumer-to-producer message exchange. Also, encryption-
based access control does not provide flexibility if con-
tent objects need to be modified by an intermediate
service, e.g., a media encoding or enhancement applica-
tion. Content encryption prevents such post-publication
4Manifests are special types of content that are used to pro-
vide structure and additional information to otherwise flat
and simple content objects [18].
modifications without revealing the secret decryption
key(s) to such services.
3.2 Interest-Based Access Control
Interest-based access control (IBAC) is an alternative
technique, though not mutually exclusive with content
encryption, for implementing access control in CCN. It
is based on interest name obfuscation and authorized
disclosure. Name obfuscation hides the target of an in-
terest from eavesdroppers. As mentioned in [11], name
obfuscation has no impact on the network since routers
use only the binary representation of a name when in-
dexing into PIT, CS, and FIB. As long as producers
generate content objects with matching names, the net-
work can seamlessly route interests and content objects
with obfuscated names. However, interests with obfus-
cated names must contain routable prefixes so that they
can be forwarded from consumers to the producers. In
other words, only a subset of name components (e.g.,
suffix of the name) is obfuscated.
Another goal of name obfuscation is to prevent unau-
thorized users from creating interests for protected con-
tent. In other words, if a particular consumer Cr is not
permitted to access content with name N , Cr should
not be able to generate N ′ = f(N), where f(·) is some
obfuscation function that mapsN to an obfuscated name
N ′. For routing purposes, only the suffix of the name
is obfuscated; there must exist a cleartext prefix that
is used to route the interest with a partially obfuscated
name to the intended producer. Possible obfuscation
functions include keyed cryptographic hash functions
and encryption algorithms. We explore both possibili-
ties in this paper.
Authorized disclosure is the second element of IBAC.
This property implies that any entity serving content
must authorize any interest for said content before it
is served. In this context, authorization is necessarily
coupled with authentication so that the entity serving
the content can determine the identify of the request-
ing consumer. Therefore, consumers must provide suf-
ficient authentication information, e.g., via an interest
signature. Thus, to implement authorized disclosure (in
the presence of router caches), any entity serving con-
tent must (a) possess the information necessary to per-
form authentication and authorization checks and (b)
actually verify the provided authentication information.
This issue is discussed at length in Section 6.2. It is
worth mentioning that disabling content caching defers
authorized disclosure checks to producers. In this case,
all interests will be forwarded to producers that posses
the information needed to perform these checks. How-
ever, by itself, prohibiting content from being cached is
not a form of access control and reduces the effective-
ness of content retrieval.
Fotiou et. al. [5] proposed an access control mech-
anism similar to IBAC for non-ICN architectures, and
conjectured that it should be applicable to ICNs. In [5],
access control computation and overhead are delegated
to a separate, non-cache entity. This entity, known
as the access control provider, maintains access control
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policies given by a specific producer. Each content ob-
ject has a pointer to a function that determines whether
or not to serve the content to the requesting consumer,
and the access control provider is responsible for eval-
uating this function. Content objects are stored at re-
laying parties, which are oblivious to the specific ac-
cess control policy protecting the content objects. Sim-
ilarly, the access control provider has no knowledge of
the consumer requesting the content (for user privacy
purposes), and just evaluates whether the relaying party
should forward the content object. The cache, in this
scenario, is not responsible for the extra computational
overhead. This approach is different from our work in
that we (1) maintain the association between content
and authorization, and (2) provide routers with an effi-
cient authorization verification method, thus eliminat-
ing the need for an external access control provider.
4. SECURITY MODEL
Let U(N) denote the set of authorized consumers for
a content object with name N generated and controlled
by a producer P , and let U¯(N) be its complement, i.e.,
the set of all unauthorized consumers. Let Path(Cr, P )
be the set of all routers on the path between the con-
sumer Cr ∈ U(N) and P . We assume the existence
of an adversary Adv who can deploy and compromise
unauthorized consumer any any router R /∈ R.5 To
keep this model realistic, we assume that the time to
mount such an attack is non-negligible, i.e., longer than
the average RTT for a single interest-content exchange.
Table 1 summarizes the notation used in the rest of this
paper.
Formally, we define Adv as a 3-tuple: (PAdv\{P}, CAdv\
U(N),RAdv \ Path(Cr, P )) where the components de-
note the set of compromised producers, consumers, and
routers, respectively. If Adv controls a producer or a
consumer then it is assumed to have complete and adap-
tive control over how they behave in an application ses-
sion. Moreover, Adv can control all of the timing, for-
mat, and actual information of each content through
compromised nodes and links.
Let Guess denote the event where Adv correctly re-
covers the obfuscated form of a content name. Let
Bypass denote the event where Adv successfully by-
passes the authorization check for a protected content
object. We define the security of an IBAC scheme with
respect to these two events as follows.
Definition 1. An IBAC scheme is secure, but subject
to replay attacks, if Pr[Guess] ≤ (κ) for any negligible
function  and a security parameter κ.
Definition 2. An IBAC scheme is secure in the pres-
ence of replay attacks, if Pr[Guess + Bypass] ≤ (κ) for
any negligible function  and a security parameter κ.
Replay attacks are artifacts of the environment where
CCN access control scheme is deployed. In other words,
5Any one of these actions can be performed adaptively, i.e.,
in response to status updates or based on observations.
Table 1: Relevant notation.
Notation Description
Adv Adversary
Cr Consumer
P Producer
prefix Producer prefix
N Content name in cleartext
N ′ Obfuscated content name
I[N ] Interest with name N
CO Content object
CO[N ] Content object with name N
ID(·, ·) Key identifier function
f(·) Obfuscation function
enc(·, ·), dec(·, ·) Symmetric-key encryption and
decryption function
Enc(·, ·),Dec(·, ·) Public-key encryption and
decryption function
H(·) Cryptographic hash function
U(N) Set of authorized consumers
Gi Access control group i
kGi Obfuscation key of group Gi
pksGi , sk
s
Gi Public and private signing key pair
associated with group Gi
κ Global security parameter
C Set of all content objects
r, t nonce and timestamp
B Nonce hash table
in networks where links are insecure, passive eavesdrop-
pers can observe previously issued interests and replay
them for protected content. Consequently, these attacks
are considered orthogonal to the security of the underly-
ing obfuscation scheme used for access control enforce-
ment. The authorized disclosure element of IBAC is
intended to prevent such replay attacks.
To justify our adversarial limitation to off-path routers,
consider the following scenario. If Adv can compromise
a router R ∈ Path(Cr, P ), then Adv is able to observe
all content that flows along this path. Therefore, we
claim that on-path adversaries motivate access control
schemes based on content encryption; IBAC will not
suffice. Moreover, we exclude adversaries capable of
capturing interests and replaying them in other parts
of the network – see Section 6.1 for details.
5. IBAC BY NAME OBFUSCATION
Recall that the intuition behind IBAC is that if con-
sumers are not allowed to access certain content, they
should not be able to issue a “correct” interest for it.
Specifically, only a consumer Cr ∈ U(N) should be able
to derive the obfuscated name N ′ of an interest request-
ing content with name N provided by producer P . In
this section, we discuss two types of name obfuscation
functions: (1) encryption functions and (2) hash func-
tions.
5.1 Encryption-Based Name Obfuscation
Let Enc(k,N) be a deterministic encryption function
which takes as input a key k ∈ {0, 1}κ and an arbitrary
long non-empty binary name string N , and generates
an encrypted name N ′. Let Dec(k,N ′) be the respec-
tive decryption function. With encryption, the goal is
for authorized clients to encrypt components of a name
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so that the producer can perform decryption to identify
and return the appropriate content object.6 Obfusca-
tion is based on knowledge of the encryption key and the
content name under IBAC protection. In other words,
even if an adversary knows the name N , it cannot gen-
erate N ′ since it does not possess the appropriate key.
To illustrate how encryption-based obfuscation would
work, assume first that Cr uses k to generate N ′ as
N ′ = Enc(k,N). P then recovers N as N = Dec(k,N ′)
to identify the content object in question and returns it
with the matching name N ′ (not N). We prove the se-
curity of this obfuscation variant of IBAC (i.e., without
authorized disclosure) in Appendix A.
Supporting Multiple Access Groups: Thus far, we
assumed that name encryption (obfuscation) keys are
known to all authorized consumers in U(N). However,
this might not be the case in practice. P might provide
content under IBAC to several access groups each with
different privileges.7 Specifically, consumers in groups
Gi(N) ⊂ U(N), for i = 1, 2, . . . , might be allowed ac-
cess to different resources. Therefore, several obfusca-
tion keys, one for each group, should be utilized. For
notation simplicity, we refer to Gi(N) as Gi. Note that
in an extreme scenario, each group would only contain
a single consumer, i.e., each individual consumer has a
unique key used to access the content in question.
To decrypt the obfuscated name N ′, P must identify
the obfuscation key used to generate N ′. This can be
achieved if such consumers specify an identifier for the
key used in the interest. Such an identifier could simply
be the digest of the obfuscation key IDGi = H(kGi),
where kGi is Gi’s encryption key. IDGi can be included
in the interest Payload field. Since matching in CCN
is exact, IDGi cannot be included in interests name.
Recall that CCN interest messages, by design, do not
carry any source information, which provides some de-
gree of anonymity. However, including IDGi enables in-
terest linkability by eavesdroppers (malicious or not).
In other words, IDGi can reveal the access group iden-
tities to which consumers belong, but not the identities
of the consumers themselves. If this linkability is an is-
sue for applications, H(kGi) can be encrypted using P ’s
public key pkP in the form IDGi = Enc(pk
P ,H(kGi)).
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Note that for two identifier values of the same group,
i.e., with the same k, to be indistinguishable, Enc(·, ·)
must be secure against chosen plaintext attacks [14].
5.2 Hash-Based Name Obfuscation
Let H(k,N) be a keyed cryptographic hash function.
The obfuscated name N ′ can be generated as N ′ =
H(k,N) for some key k ∈ {0, 1}κ. Since hash functions
6Recall that a cleartext name prefix is needed to route the
interest to the intended producer.
7We assume that each content object is only accessible by
a single access group. However, this assumption will be
relaxed later in the paper.
8Since a consumer cannot be expected to know the router
from which content will be served, it is not plausible for
them to encrypt these IDs with the public key of a (set of)
router(s).
are one-way, producers must maintain a hash table that
maps obfuscated names to the original content name,
i.e., M : N ′ = H(k,N)→ N for all deployed keys.9 The
size of this hash table is O(|K|×|C|), where K is the set
of all keys and C is set of all content objects generated
or published by P under IBAC protection. This ap-
proach provides the same benefits of encryption-based
name obfuscation, however, it incurs additional com-
putation and storage overhead at the producer. Thus,
while keyed hash functions are viable for name obfus-
cation, deterministic encryption is a much better ap-
proach.
6. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
In this section we discuss the security of IBAC with
respect to the adversary model described in Section 4.
6.1 Replay Attacks
Regardless of the obfuscation function used, both pre-
viously described IBAC schemes are susceptible to re-
play attacks. This is because both obfuscation functions
are deterministic. Therefore, an eavesdropper Adv ∈
U¯(N) could issue an interest with a captured N ′ and
receive the corresponding content under IBAC protec-
tion from either the producer or a router cache. In
other words, the same “feature” that makes it possi-
ble for authorized consumers to fetch IBAC-protected
content from router caches also makes it susceptible to
replay attacks.
Such replay attacks are problematic in many access
control systems. Standard countermeasures include the
use of random, per-message nonces or timestamps. Nonces
help ensure that each message is unique, whereas times-
tamps protect against interests being replayed at later
points in time. Thus, to mitigate replay attacks, we use
both nonces and timestamps. In particular, each con-
sumer Cr ∈ U(N) must issue an interest with (1) name
N ′, (2) a randomly generated nonce r, and (3) a fresh
timestamp t. The reason why we use both nonces and
timestamps is to allow for loosely synchronized clocks
and unpredicted network latencies. Note that if (1)
clocks of consumers, producers, and involved routers
in IBAC can be perfectly synchronized, and (2) net-
work latencies can be accurately predicted, only times-
tamps are sufficient for replay detection. Moreover,
since nonces and timestamps serve a purpose which is
orthogonal to content identification and message rout-
ing, they are included in the interest payload.
Consumer nonces are random κ-bit values. If a router
receives a duplicate nonce, it can safely assume that the
corresponding interest is replayed and drop it. Let w
be a time window associated with authorized content.10
To determine if a duplicate nonce was received, produc-
ers (or caches) must maintain a collection of nonces for
9Producers do not have to keep hash tables for all possible
keys of size κ, only tables of keys used by producers and
issued to access groups.
10 Determining the proper value of w is outside the scope of
this paper. However, a logical approach is for routers to use
the lifetime of authorized content as w.
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each such content. In other words, this historical infor-
mation is necessary to prevent replay attacks. Times-
tamps themselves are not stored, they are only used
to determine if the received interest is issued within
the acceptable time window w. Once this time win-
dow elapses, all of the stored nonces are erased and the
content is subsequently flushed from the cache.
Although using nonces and timestamps allows detec-
tion of replayed interests, Adv capturing interests can
still use their obfuscated names N ′ to fabricate another
interest with legitimate r and t values. Therefore, we
also stipulate that r and t should be authenticated via
a digital signature; their signature σ is also included in
the interest Payload field. In order to bind r and t to
their corresponding interest, N ′ is also included in the
signature computation. σ generation and verification
should be performed using the public and private key
pairs associated with each access group Gi.
After adding nonces, timestamps, and a signature,
interest Payload fields take the following form:
Payload =
(
IDGi , r, t, σ = SignsksGi
(N ′||IDGi ||r||t)
)
where IDGi is the identify of group Gi, and sksGi is a
signing key distributed to all consumers in Gi. To ver-
ify σ, the matching public key pksGi must be obtained.
For the remainder of this paper, we use the term autho-
rization information to refer to all information included
in interest Payload fields for the purpose of supporting
IBAC.
One alternative to digital signatures would be to use
a keyed hash or a Message Authentication Code func-
tion such as (HMAC) [15]. In this case, consumers and
routers would need to share the key used in the HMAC
computation. This means that either consumers or pro-
ducers need to distribute HMAC keys to all involved
routers. This, however, is problematic for two main
reasons: (1) compromising routers leads to HMAC keys
leakage, and, more importantly, (2) if consumers pro-
vide routers with these keys, the former need to know
the set of routers that their interests traverse before
issuing them. Furthermore, since HMAC keys should
only be shared among involved all entities, i.e., Cr and
all routers on Path(Cr, P ), they must be distributed se-
curely. Regardless of the distribution method used, this
incurs extra overhead and complexity compared to sim-
ply including, in cleartext, signature verification (pub-
lic) keys in content objects.
Finally, consider the following scenario where two
routers R1 and R2 cache content object CO[N
′] which is
under IBAC protection. Assume that consumer Cr re-
quests CO[N ′] by sending an interest I[N ′] with valid
authorization information that includes r and t. As-
sume that I[N ′] is satisfied from R1’s cache. At the
same time, Adv, an eavesdropper between Cr and R1,
records I[N ′]. In this case, Adv can replay I[N ′] to
R2 and receive CO[N
′] from the cache since routers do
not synchronize stored nonces. Therefore, there is no
way for R2 to know that r and t were already used at
R1. One way of solving this problem is to have routers
share used nonces lists for each content under IBAC
they serve from cache. For this method to be effective,
such nonces lists need to be securely shared with every
single router in the network. This might not be fea-
sible in large networks such as the Internet. Another
approach is to have more accurate synchronized clocks
allowing a smaller time window for the aforementioned
attack to be carried.
6.2 Authorized Content-Key Binding Rule
Although the aforementioned method for generating
authorization information mitigates replay attacks, it
also raises several questions. Firstly, how does a router
efficiently verify the signature in interest Payload fields?
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, if a router is
able to obtain the key(s) necessary to verify this signa-
ture, how can the router be sure that such key(s) can
be trusted?
To address these problems we propose a mutual trust
framework for authorized disclosure. Ghali et al. [8]
first studied the problem of trust in NDN, and ICNs in
general, as a means of preventing content poisoning at-
tacks [7, 6]. Even if routers can verify content signatures
before replying from their cache, it does not mean that
said content is actually authentic. Ghali et al. observed
that this verification process requires insight about trust
in public keys (used in verification) that is only known
to applications. Consequently, this requires that all in-
terests must either supply (1) the hash of the public key
used to verify the signature, or (2) the hash of the re-
quested content. In effect, the interest reflects the trust
context of the issuing consumer in a form enforceable
at the network layer. This framework can be viewed
as one-way trust of content by routers. We extend this
framework to allow producers to distribute information
about authorized consumers, which can also be enforce-
able at the network layer. This allows routers to make
trust decisions about individual interests.
Recall that in order for routers to verify which inter-
ests are authorized to access cached content protected
under IBAC, the signature in Payload must be verified.
To achieve this, producers should include the appropri-
ate verification key with each IBAC-protected content
object. To better understand this, assume the following
scenario. Consumer Cr ∈ Gi, for Gi ⊂ U(N), requests
content with name N by issuing an interest with ob-
fuscated name N ′, and IDGi , r, t and σ in Payload as
described in Section 6.1. Assume that the matching
content is not cached anywhere in the network. Once
this interest reaches the producer P , the latter verifies
σ and replies with the content that also includes the
verifying key pksGi .
11 Router R will then cache pksGi
along with the content itself. Once another interest for
N ′ is received, R uses the cached pksGi to verify σ and
returns the corresponding cached content object.
We formalize this in the following policy, denoted as
the Authorized Content-Key Binding (ACKB) rule:
11The content object signature must also be computed over
pksGi to bind it to the message.
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Algorithm 1 InterestGeneration
1: INPUT: routable prefix, N , kGi , pk
s
Gi , sk
s
Gi , κ
2: IDGi ← H(kGi )
3: N ′ ← /routable prefix/f(kGi , Suffix(N, routable prefix))
4: r $←− {0, 1}κ
5: t← CurrentTime()
6: σ ← SignsksGi
(
N ′||IDGi ||r||t
)
7: Payload :=
(
IDGi , r, t, σ
)
8: return I[N ′] :=
(
N ′, Payload
)
Algorithm 2 ContentObjectGeneration
1: INPUT: I[N ′] :=
(
routable prefix, N ′, Payload
)
2:
(
IDGi , r, t, σ
)
:= Payload
3: pksGi ← LoopupVerificationKeyForID(IDGi )
4: if VerifypksGi
(σ) then
5: keGi ← LookupDecryptionKeyForID(IDGi )
6: N ← Dec(keGi , Suffix(N
′, routable prefix))
7: data← RetrieveContent(N)
8: return CO[N ′] := (N ′, data, pksGi )
9: else
10: Drop I[N ′]
11: end if
ACKB: Cached content protected under IBAC must
reflect the verification key associated with the autho-
rization policy.
The protocol for IBAC-protected content retrieval re-
lies on this rule. Algorithms 1 and 2 outline the in-
terest and content object generation procedures. Note
that the function Suffix(N, routable prefix) returns all
name components of N except the ones included in
routable prefix.12 Also, the router verification procedure
is outlined in Algorithm 3. If this procedure returns
Pass, then the content object found in the cache is for-
warded downstream to the associated interface. Note
that Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 use obfuscation key kGi
and signing key pairs (pksGi , sk
s
Gi). For completeness, a
complete sequence diagram showing multiple interest-
content exchanges is shown in Figure 1. Both consumers
belong to the same access group, i.e., Cr1, Cr2 ∈ Gi.
In Appendix A, we show that this mutual trust frame-
work for authorized disclosure enables IBAC with stronger
security guarantees in the presence of replay attacks.
6.3 Serving Content toMultiple Access Groups
One problem with encryption-based name obfusca-
tion occurs when a content object with name N is ac-
cessible by different groups. According to Algorithms
1 and 2, the obfuscated name N ′ contains a suffix en-
crypted with keys associated with each access group.
Therefore, a single content object might have several
names depending on the number of groups authorized
to access it. Since routers employs exact matching for
cache lookup13, several copies of the same content could
possibly be cached.
To solve this problem, content objects should have
12For instance, Suffix(/edu/uci/ics/home.html, /edu/uci/)
would return ics/home.html.
13In CCN, not in NDN.
Algorithm 3 RouterAuthorizationCheck
1: INPUT: I[N ′], cached CO[N ′], B
2:
(
IDGi , r, t, σ
)
:= Payload
3: (N ′, ·, pksGi ) := CO[N
′]
4: if B[N ′] contains r then
5: Drop I[N ′]; return Fail
6: else
7: if Timestamp t is invalid then
8: Drop I[N ′]; return Fail
9: else
10: if VerifypksGi
(σ) then
11: B[N ′] := B[N ′] ∪ r
12: return Pass
13: else
14: Drop I[N ′]; return Fail
15: end if
16: end if
17: end if
the exact same name regardless of access control groups
permitted access. This can be achieved using the hash-
based name obfuscation function described in Section 5.2.
However, cached content needs to contain every autho-
rization signature verification key that could be used
to access said content. In other words, producers need
to provide all possible public keys that can be used to
access the content under IBAC protection. Consider
the following scenario: a content object CO[N ] is ac-
cessible by two access groups Gi and Gj . In this case,
the producer needs to provide both pksGi and pk
s
Gj with
CO[N ′], i.e.,
CO[N ′] := (N ′, data, pksGi , pk
s
Gj )
Whenever a router R caching CO[N ′] receives an in-
terest issued by a consumer in any of the authorized
access groups, R uses the group identity included in
the Payload field to determine σ’s verification key.
Note that content object sizes might increase signifi-
cantly depending on how many groups are allowed ac-
cess. We do not discuss this issue further, since the
trade-off between having multiple cached versions of the
same content and having longer content objects carry-
ing all verification keys is ultimately the application’s
decision.
6.4 IBAC Variations
We do not claim that any of the IBAC variations
discussed above is superior to another. Each has its
own strengths and weaknesses. However, to help guide
the decision about which variation to use, we make the
following claims based on the application needs and as-
sumptions. Note that some claims provide privacy as
well as access control.
1. If replay attacks are not a concern, then consumers
only need to use a name obfuscation function and
include their group identity in the Payload.
2. If replay attacks are plausible and name privacy
is a concern, then name obfuscation must be used
and authorization information, as described in Sec-
tion 6.1, must be included in interest Payload fields.
3. If replay attacks are plausible but name privacy is
not a concern, then only authorization information
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Cr1 ∈ Gi
Cr2 ∈ Gi
R P
IDGi ← H(kGi)
N ′ ← /prefix/Enc(kGi ,Suffix(N, prefix))
r1
$←− {0, 1}κ, t1 ← CurrentTime()
σ ← SignsksGi (N
′||IDGi ||r1||t1)
Payload := (IDGi , r1, t1, σ)
I[N ′]1 := (N ′, Payload) -
I[N ′]1 := (N ′, payload) -
pksGi ← LoopupVerificationKeyForID(IDGi)
VerifypksGi
(σ)
kGi ← LookupDecryptionKeyForID(IDGi)
N ← Dec(kGi ,Suffix(N ′, prefix))
data← RetrieveContent(N)
CO[N ′] := (N ′, data, pksGi)ff
Cache CO[N ′]
CO[N ′] := (N ′, data, pksGi)ff
IDGi ← H(kGi)
N ′ ← /prefix/Enc(kGi ,Suffix(N, prefix))
r2
$←− {0, 1}κ, t2 ← CurrentTime()
σ ← SignsksGi (N
′||IDGi ||r2||t2)
Payload := (IDGi , r2, t2, σ)
I[N ′]2 := (N ′, payload) -
VerifypksGi
(σ), r2 and t2
CO[N ′] := (N ′, data, pksGi)ff
Figure 1: Consumer and producer exchanges for
IBAC-protected content.
is sufficient.
Claim 3 might seem counterintuitive with the idea of
IBAC. Recall, however, that router authorization checks
prevent unauthorized consumers from retrieving cached
content under IBAC protection. Even if content name
is not obfuscated, Adv cannot forge Payload autho-
rization information, and therefore cannot violate IBAC
protection guarantees.
6.5 Revocation
Generally speaking, revocation is a challenge in all
access control schemes involving secrets shared among
group members. Recall that all consumers belonging to
the same access control group in IBAC share the same
obfuscation keys. If one of them leaves the group14, the
producer will have to create a new key and distribute
it to all remaining authorized consumers. We will not
discuss this issue further since we believe it is not part
of the core access control protocol.
Moreover, in-network caching can cause IBAC con-
tent to be accessed by revoked consumers. Assume con-
tent CO[N ] is under access control and has a cached
version in router R. Assume consumer Cr, connected
(directly or indirectly) to R, is authorized to access
CO[N ]. However, while CO[N ] is cached, Cr’s access is
revoked. At the same time, the latter sends an interest
requesting CO[N ]. In this case, R will grant access and
14For instance, consumers not renewing their subscription for
a certain service.
reply with CO[N ] from its cache. This is due to the
fact that the cached version of CO[N ] is not updated
with the correct authorization information (i.e., verifi-
cation key(s)). However, this can be solved by setting
the ExpiryTime field of CO[N ] to a value that reflects
consumer revocation frequency.
Online revocation protocols, such as OCSP [19], would
induce extra communication between R and P , which
nearly defeats the purpose of the cache entirely. In this
case, R would be better suited forwarding the interest
upstream to P . Another option for the producer would
be to distribute certificate revocation lists (CRLs) [4]
with every fresh content. This, however, introduces fur-
ther issues for routers and consumers. Firstly, routers
would need to store CRLs and keep them updated fre-
quently. Secondly, authorized consumers would need
their own public and private key pair to compute σ.
Finally, routers would need to perform additional veri-
fications against the CLR. Overall, this approach suffers
from increased storage, consumer management, compu-
tation, and bandwidth complexity.
7. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the overhead induced by
each variation of the proposed IBAC scheme.
7.1 Computational Overhead
We first focus on the computational overhead for routers
and producers. This overhead is captured in terms of
cryptographic and data structure operations, e.g., sig-
nature verification and hash table lookup costs. Ta-
ble 2 summarizes these results. To further understand
the computational overhead, we compare two cases: (1)
when routers perform authorization checks, and (2) when
they do not. Let τoverhead = τcheck+τverify+τupdate be
the overhead induced by the authorization check when
routers receive interests, where τcheck is the time re-
quired to check for nonce duplication and timestamp
staleness, τverify is the time to verify the Payload sig-
nature, and Tupdate is the time to update the nonce
data collection. Since cache lookup and interest for-
warding are performed regardless of whether or not
routers perform authorization checks, we omit them
from this equation. Similarly, τcheck and τupdate are
negligible when compared to the cost of signature veri-
fication τverify; thus, they are also excluded.
A router incurs a computational cost of τoverhead for
every received interest requesting content under IBAC
protection. Therefore, we quantify τoverhead by mea-
suring the time it takes to perform a single signature
verification. We also experiment with batch verifica-
tion techniques to better amortize the cost of signa-
ture verification across series of interests. While this
naturally increases content retrieval latency since sig-
natures are accumulated in case of batch verification, it
reduces router computational overhead. Table 3 shows
the amount of improvement using a variety of signature
verification algorithms. Note that, when modeling in-
terest arrival rates using a Poisson distribution, both
individual and batch signature verification incur nearly
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Table 2: Overview of per-interest IBAC-induced computational overhead for routers and producers.
IBAC Variation
IBAC-induced Computation Overhead
Routers Producers
Name Obfuscation
Encryption None One decryption
Hash None One hash table lookup
Interest Signatures
Encryption One signature verification, one nonce
and timestamp verification
One decryption, one signature verifica-
tion, Two hash table lookups (decryp-
tion key and signing key resolution)
Hash One signature verification, one nonce
and timestamp verification, one hash
table lookup (signing key resolution)
One signature verification, three hash
table lookups (decryption key, signing
key and name resolution)
Table 3: Individual and batch ElGamal signa-
ture verification times.
Key Batch Sig. Indiv. Batch
Improved
Size Size Size Time Time
1024b 10 512KB 0.599s 0.322s 46%
1024b 10 8MB 0.888s 0.615s 30%
1024b 50 512KB 2.918s 1.579s 46%
1024b 50 8MB 4.315s 2.991s 30%
2048b 10 512KB 4.065s 2.207s 46%
2048b 10 8MB 4.104s 2.269s 45%
2048b 50 512KB 20.081s 11.029s 45%
2048b 50 8MB 21.301s 12.536s 41%
3072b 10 512KB 12.406s 6.789s 45%
3072b 10 8MB 12.804s 7.122s 44%
3072b 50 512KB 60.174s 32.877s 45%
3072b 50 8MB 64.347s 35.601s 45%
the same overhead in certain conditions, as we will show
below.
Denial of service (DoS) is an obvious concern if routers
perform authorization checks. Let λ be the rate of
arrival interests for IBAC-protected content cached in
router R, and let µ be the service rate for interests,
i.e., the rate at which interests are processed (parsed,
verified, etc.). If µ < λ, then the router will be over en-
cumbered with interests to process [9]. We envision that
in legitimate scenarios without malicious entities gen-
erating interests with fake authorization information,
only a small percentage δ of arrival interests will be
requesting content under IBAC protection. To assess
how susceptible routers are to DoS attacks induced by
IBAC authorization checks, we empirically analyze the
effect of δ on the interest service rate of a router. These
service rates, which use different signature verification
techniques – individual and batch – denoted µS and µB ,
respectively, are shown in Figure 2.
We assume that interests arrive at a base rate of
λ1 = 40 [3]; larger values for λ are provided to see
at which point µ < λ due to authorization checks. By
the exponential property of the Poisson process, µ is
calculated as follows:
µ =
1− δ
τprocess
+
δ
τprocess + τverify
,
where τprocess represents interest processing time not in-
cluding signature verification15, and τverify is the time
15τprocess = 1/mu for interests not requesting IBAC-
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Figure 2: Interest service rates for various per-
centages of IBAC-protected interests.
required to perform individual or batch signature ver-
ification. In our experiment, we assume a constant
τprocess = 0.005s and only vary τverify. To do so, we
assume a key size of 1024b, batch size of 10, and signa-
ture size of 512KB. According to Table 3, this results in
τverify = 0.599s and τverify = 0.322s for individual and
batch verification, respectively. Our experiments show
that the decay of µ as a function of δ is almost iden-
tical for both batch and verification techniques. This
is due to the fact that only a small fraction of inter-
ests are affected by the verification step. Furthermore,
our results show that µ > λ is true, i.e., the router ser-
vicing process is stable for reasonable interest arrival
rates. Our experiments show that µ < λ when λ = 160
and δ ≥ 0.2. Moreover, when a Poisson process is as-
sumed, both individual and batch signature verification
perform similarly for small values of δ. However, batch
signature verification prove to be advantageous in larger
δ values. For instance, for δ = 0.2, using batch verifi-
cation provides less than 1% service rate improvement,
where it provides 3% and 46% for δ values equal to 0.8
and 1, respectively.
7.2 Storage Overhead
Storage overhead varies from producer to router. If
protected content.
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hash-based name obfuscation is used, producers incur
the cost of maintaining a hash table to map obfuscated
names to their original values. However, if content
name contains variable name components, e.g., query
string-like values in URIs, the hash table size can grow
significantly since it has to contain all possible varia-
tions. Moreover, producers must bear the storage cost
of IBAC access group keys if encryption-based obfusca-
tion functions are used. Similarly, routers must bear the
cost of storing variable-length tuples of key identities
IDGi and the actual verification keys pk
s
Gi , along with
a theoretically unbounded collection of nonces for each
IBAC-protected content. This finite amount of storage
can be abused to mount DoS attacks on routers.
7.3 Bandwidth Overhead
In terms of bandwidth overhead, each interest and
content object is expanded to include additional au-
thorization information, e.g., interest payloads with au-
thorization information and content objects with au-
thorization keys. Interests without authorization pay-
loads will only increase (or decrease) by the expansion
factor of the obfuscated name. If authorization pay-
loads are included, then interest messages will grow by
|r| + |t| + |σ| + |IDG|, where |r| = κ. Content object
CO[N ] grows with length
∑L
i=1 |pksGi |, where L is the
number of access groups allowed to access CO[N ] and
|pksGi | is the public key size associated with group Gi.
8. CONCLUSION
We studied the problem of access control in ICNs.
We proposed an Interest-Based Access Control (IBAC)
scheme that supports hash- and encryption-based name
obfuscation. We addressed the problem of replay at-
tacks by formulating a mutual trust framework between
producers and consumers – enforced in the network-
layer – that enables routers to perform authorization
checks before satisfying interests from cache. We as-
sessed the computational, storage, and bandwidth over-
head induced by each variant of the proposed IBAC
scheme. Ultimately, we believe that our work brings
ICNs one step closer to fulfilling their promise of a more
secure networking paradigm.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS OF SECURITY
In this section, we prove the security properties of
IBAC with and without authorized disclosure with re-
spect to the adversarial model described in Section 4.
In the following, let N be the name of a content ob-
ject under IBAC protection and generated by P . Also,
let adversary Adv = (PAdv \ {P}, CAdv \ U(N),RAdv \
Path(Cr, P )), where Cr ∈ U(N).
Theorem 1. The IBAC scheme without authorized
disclosure is secure, but subject to replay attacks, against
Adv if an indistinguishably-secure (IND-secure) deter-
ministic encryption algorithm is used for name obfus-
cation.
Note: IND security is typically identical to CPA secu-
rity in the public-key setting since the adversary is as-
sumed to have access to the public key [14]. In this case,
neither the encryption nor decryption key is known to
Adv.
Proof. Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an IND-secure
(deterministic) encryption scheme consisting of three
probabilistic polynomial time algorithms Gen, Enc, and
Dec for key generation, encryption, and decryption, re-
spectively. Let ke and kd be the encryption and de-
cryption keys produced by Gen. For any interest name
N , it holds that Dec(kd,Enc(ke, N)) = N . Let Adv
be any probabilistic polynomial adversary. The defi-
nition of the eavesdropping indistinguishability experi-
ment, adapted for plaintext interest messages, denoted
ExpindAdv,Π, is as follows:
1. Adv is given input 1κ and outputs a pair of interest
names N0 and N1, and ke and kd are computed by
running Gen(1κ).
2. A single bit b← {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom. The challenger computes the ciphertext c←
Enc(ke, Nb), which is given to Adv.
3. Adv outputs a single bit b′.
4. The output of the experiment is said to be 1 if
b′ = b and 0 otherwise.
Let ExpindAdv,Π(κ, b) be the same experiment run but where
bit b is given as an input value. By the definition of
IND-security, it follows that
|Pr[ExpindAdv,Π(κ, 1) = 1]− Pr[ExpindAdv,Π(κ, 0) = 1]| ≤ (κ),
for some negligible function . Recall that Guess is the
event that Adv correctly guesses the obfuscated version
a content name. The probability of Adv decrypting a
message is at least Pr[Guess]. Therefore, the event when
Adv successfully guesses the obfuscated version of the
name, is when Adv outputs b′ = 1 when b = 1 and
b′ = 0 when b = 0. Thus,
Pr[Guess] = |Pr[ExpindAdv,Π(κ, 1) = 1]
− Pr[ExpindAdv,Π(κ, 0) = 1]|
≤ (κ)
This concludes the proof.
Theorem 2. The IBAC scheme with authorized dis-
closure is secure, in presence of replay attacks, against
Adv if an indistinguishably-secure (IND-secure) deter-
ministic encryption algorithm is used with an existen-
tially unforgeable signature scheme.
Proof. In Theorem 1, we proved that Pr[Guess] ≤
(κ). It is easy to see that the additional Payload infor-
mation – the random nonce, timestamp, and signature
– are all distinct for each interest. Therefore, including
this information leaks no information that improves the
adversaries advantage or improves Pr[Guess].
We now assess Pr[Bypass]. Recall that this event oc-
curs when Adv bypasses the authorization check at a
router to recover content from a cache. Without knowl-
edge of sksGi , this only occurs if Adv is able to forge the
Payload signature. By definition of the existentially
unforgeable signature scheme, Adv is not able to gen-
erate an input set (Nˆ ′, ˆIDGi , rˆ, tˆ) 6= (N ′, IDGi , r, t) such
that VerifypksGi
(σˆ) occurs with non-negligible probabil-
ity. Thus, Pr[Bypass] ≤ (κ). Finally, since the sum
of two negligible probabilities is also negligible, then
Pr[Guess + Bypass] ≤ (κ) .
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